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Noise in quantum information processing is often viewed as a disruptive and difficult-to-avoid feature, es-
pecially in near-term quantum technologies. However, noise has often played beneficial roles, from enhancing
weak signals in stochastic resonance to protecting the privacy of data in differential privacy. It is then natural to
ask, can we harness the power of quantum noise that is beneficial to quantum computing? An important current
direction for quantum computing is its application to machine learning, such as classification problems. One
outstanding problem in machine learning for classification is its sensitivity to adversarial examples. These are
small, undetectable perturbations from the original data where the perturbed data is completely misclassified in
otherwise extremely accurate classifiers. They can also be considered as ‘worst-case’ perturbations by unknown
noise sources. We show that by taking advantage of depolarisation noise in quantum circuits for classification, a
robustness bound against adversaries can be derived where the robustness improves with increasing noise. This
robustness property is intimately connected with an important security concept called differential privacy which
can be extended to quantum differential privacy. For the protection of quantum data, this is the first quantum
protocol that can be used against the most general adversaries. Furthermore, we show how the robustness in the
classical case can be sensitive to the details of the classification model, but in the quantum case the details of
classification model are absent, thus also providing a potential quantum advantage for classical data that is in-
dependent of quantum speedups. This opens the opportunity to explore other ways in which quantum noise can
be used in our favour, as well as identifying other ways quantum algorithms can be helpful that is independent
of quantum speedups.
I. INTRODUCTION
Noise in quantum information processing has long been
viewed as a feature to avoid and remove, notably in quan-
tum computation. However, in the Noisy Intermediate-Scale
Quantum (NISQ) era of near-term quantum computing [33],
the presence of noise is inevitable. The focus is both on re-
ducing the effects of quantum noise, for example using error-
mitigation [9, 40] and for finding protocols whose integrity
can nevertheless withstand this noise. However, a parallel
approach can be taken to instead study noise under a posi-
tive lens. In classical information processing, noise is actively
leveraged in many applications including strengthening secu-
rity and privacy using differential privacy [8], enhancing weak
signals using stochastic resonance [12], improving signal res-
olution after truncating data with dithering [34] and speeding
convergence rates in neural networks [20]. Can we look at
quantum noise in this same positive light and use it to our ad-
vantage?
One important proposed application of these quantum de-
vices is performing machine-learning tasks like classification
[5, 16] and classification algorithms can be less vulnerable
against noise. An intuitive reason behind this is that classi-
fication only has few possible outputs and machine learning
can still provide accurate classification in the classical world
despite the ‘messiness’ of real-life data like images and sound
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recordings. Indeed, a recent work [22] showed how quantum
binary classifiers can be made robust against common sources
of quantum noise by choosing a right encoding of classical
data into quantum states.
However, despite being tolerant to small amounts of noise
with known sources, classification algorithms are generally
not protected against unknown ‘worst-case’ noise sources,
such as adversarial attacks. In fact, classification algorithms
in machine learning are often very sensitive to adversarial at-
tacks and this presents a key obstacle for the future develop-
ment of classical machine learning [39]. These adversaries
perturb the original data point by only a small undetectable
amount, yet the new datapoint, known as an adversarial ex-
ample, is completely misclassified in otherwise extremely ac-
curate classifiers. This observation presents an impetus for
the vibrant field called adversarial machine learning [18, 21]
and this has recently been extended to the quantum domain in
adversarial quantum learning [24, 26, 41]. While many im-
portant methods focus on finding new and more robust ver-
sions of existing algorithms [14], including on quantum de-
vices [26, 41], this approach is generally vulnerable to coun-
terattacks and don’t provide theoretical guarantees against all
possible adversaries [43].
We take a different approach that does not require invent-
ing new algorithms to improve robustness, yet can provide a
robustness guarantee against any unknown perturbation, such
as from an adversary. We begin from our intuition that noise
is a kind of scrambling mechanism. It can ‘scramble’ the ef-
fects of disturbances made to one’s original data, for instance
by adversaries, thus diminishing the effects adversarial attacks
ar
X
iv
:2
00
3.
09
41
6v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
20
 M
ar 
20
20
2can have. Therefore we can ask whether noise, instead of hin-
dering the computation, can in fact assist in the presence of
adversarial attacks?
More specifically, noise in the classical realm has been as-
sociated with improving the privacy of algorithms, providing
a property called differential privacy [8]. Differential privacy
is the property of an algorithm whose output cannot distin-
guish small changes in the initial dataset, like the presence or
absence of one party’s datapoint, hence in this way preserving
privacy of that party. This is in fact the very property we want
in making our algorithm robust against adversarial examples,
which are small changes to the initial dataset that induce mis-
classification.
We demonstrate that by including depolarisation in one’s
quantum circuit for classification, we can achieve quantum
differential privacy and in turn, be able to provide robustness
bounds in the presence of adversaries which were not possible
before. This is the most natural mechanism to exploit noise
to protect quantum data, which appear in condensed matter
systems, quantum communication networks, quantum simu-
lation, quantum metrology and quantum control. In addition,
we show how the robustness bound in the classical case can
be sensitive to the details of the classification model but in
the quantum case this bound is dependent only on the number
of possible class categories and no other feature of the clas-
sification model. This therefore demonstrates an important
example of a security advantage in performing a classifica-
tion algorithm on a quantum device versus a purely classical
device, for both quantum and classical data.
We begin by defining classification, adversarial examples
and differential privacy. Then we demonstrate how adding
depolarisation noise in quantum classifiers can induce quan-
tum differential privacy which can in turn provide protection
against adversarial examples.
II. BACKGROUND
We briefly review the classification problem in both the
classical and quantum domains before introducing the con-
cept of adversarial examples. We then define classical and
quantum differential privacy, which we later employ as a key
tool to achieve robustness of our classifier against adversarial
examples.
A. Classification task
A classification task is a mapping from a set of classical or
quantum input states to a label chosen from a finite set. If the
size of this finite set is K ≥ 2, we have a K-multiclass clas-
sification problem [13]. K = 2 is the special case of binary
classification, e.g., given images of only ants or cicadas, to
decide which picture belongs to which insect.
Definition 1 (K-multiclass classification). The algorithmA :
Σ → C is called a K-multiclass classification algorithm if it
maps the set of input states Σ onto the set C = {0, ...,K− 1}.
Let the state σ ∈ Σ and C ∈ C. If A(σ) = C, then C is the
predicted class label assigned to σ.
In machine learning, the algorithm A does not need to
be pre-defined and can instead be learned through a training
dataset D. This dataset D = {σi,Y(σi)}Mi=1 consists of M
pairs of input states σi and their corresponding class labels
represented by the K-dimensional vector Y(σi). Its kth en-
try Yk(σi) = 1 if the class label of σi is k and every other
entry of Yk(σi) is zero otherwise. To learn A, we first de-
fine a parameterised function f(θ, σi) ∈ RK where θ are free
parameters that can be tuned. The learning happens as θ is
optimized to minimize the empirical risk
min
θ
1
M
M∑
i=1
L(f(θ, σi),Y(σi)), (1)
where L refers to a predefined loss function. The goal in
learning is to minimise this empirical risk Eq. (1) for one’s
given training dataset D, where the optimized parameters
are denoted θ∗. Given test state σ, we can define y(σ) =
f(θ∗, σ)/‖f(θ∗, σ)‖1 as the score vector among K labels,
where ‖ · ‖1 denotes the l1-norm and y(σ) ∈ RK is the nor-
malized vector of f(θ∗, σ). Then the kth entry of the vector
function f(θ∗, σ) = yk(σ) ∈ [0, 1] can be interpreted as the
probability that σ is assigned the label k. Then the learned
classification algorithm A outputs the class label C for a in-
put state σ using the condition
C ≡ arg max
k
yk(σ) ≡ A(σ), (2)
where the final class labelC is decided by identifying the class
label with the highest corresponding probability.
For the quantum K-multiclass classification task with
quantum test state σ we can employ a quantum circuit, see
Fig. 1(a), to compute y(σ) instead of using a classical circuit.
We can identify yk(σ) to be the probability of the final mea-
surement outcome of the quantum circuit being k,
yk(σ) = Tr(ΠkE(σ ⊗ |a〉〈a|)), (3)
where Πk is a POVM, E is a quantum operation that contains
information about the trained parameters θ∗ [4] and |a〉〈a| is
an ancilla. However, precise values of the probabilities yk(σ)
can only be obtained in the infinite sampling regime. This
means that if only N measurements are allowed at the output
of the circuit, we can only obtain an estimated value y(N)k (σ)
of the output probabilities.
B. Adversarial examples
Adversarial examples are attacks on input examples to clas-
sification problems that lead to misclassification. In particular,
these include worst-case attacks where the adversary can craft
small imperceptible perturbations σ → ρ about a given cor-
rectly classified input σ that result in misclassification [15].
This means that while the true labels σ and ρ are identical,
3FIG. 1: (a) A generic quantum circuit to estimate yk(σ), which
is the probability that test state σ is assigned a class label k in a
K-multiclass classification problem. |a〉 is an ancilla state where
σ ⊗ |a〉〈a| is D-dimensional and Πk is Dmeas-dimensional, where
Dmeas ≥ K. With finite N measurements at the output, one obtains
an estimate y(N)k (σ) for yk(σ). (b) Adding depolarisation noise
channels Npi along the circuit, where i = 1, ..., l, the output in the
N → ∞ sampling limit becomes y˜k(σ). With finite N measure-
ments at the output, one obtains the estimate y˜(N)k (σ). See text for
details.
if ρ is an adversarial example, A will class them differently.
We can define adversarial examples more formally as follows
[38].
Definition 2 (Adversarial example). Suppose we are given a
well-trained classification function A(·) as defined in Eq. (2),
an input example (σ,C), a distance metric h(·, ·) and a small
enough threshold value L. Then ρ is said to be an adversarial
example if the following is true
(A(σ) = C) ∧ (A(ρ) 6= C) ∧ (h(σ, ρ) ≤ L). (4)
If σ, ρ are classical states, suitable distance metrics are the
lp-norms, so h(σ, ρ) = ||σ, ρ||p. If σ, ρ are quantum states, we
will use the trace distance h(σ, ρ) = τ(σ, ρ) = Tr(|ρ−σ|)/2.
In the rest of this paper, we will use Greek letters to refer
to quantum states and bold Roman letters to refer to classical
states unless otherwise specified.
C. Differential privacy
Differential privacy is an important concept in computer
science that quantifies the sensitivity of the outputs of algo-
rithms to changes in their input data. The less sensitive it is,
the better the algorithm can preserve the privacy of the input
data. Here we can formulate the definition of classical differ-
ential privacy as follows [8].
Definition 3 (Classical differential privacy). SupposeM is a
classical algorithm that takes as input entries x ∈ X of some
classical database X and outputs values belonging to the set
S. ThenM is said to satisfy classical (, δ)-differential pri-
vacy if, for all x ∈ X , x′ ∈ X ′ which are separated by a
small distance, e.g., Hamming distance h(x,x′) ≤ 1 and all
measurable sets S ⊆ Range(M),
Pr(M(x) ∈ S) ≤ ePr(M(x′) ∈ S) + δ, (5)
where Pr(·) denotes the probability of (·) and , δ > 0. We
call (, δ) the privacy budget for the algorithm.
Informally, this definition says that for two input data points
separated by a small distance, a small privacy budget means
that the output of the algorithm differs very little, hence the
input information is partially kept private. The selection of
this distance h(·, ·) varies depending on the task, e.g., Ham-
ming distance or lp distance [8]. A natural distance h(·, ·) for
quantum data is the trace distance, which we can employ in a
definition for quantum differential privacy [44] which we will
use throughout this paper. An alternative definition for quan-
tum differential privacy [1] does not require quantum data σ
and τ to be close in trace distance, but rather that ρ is obtain-
able by applying a quantum operation on only a single regis-
ter of σ. See also [2] for a related definition applied to PAC
learning. However, for our purposes of working directly with
quantum states σ and ρ, the use of trace distance is the most
appropriate.
SupposeM(σ,ΠS) is a quantum algorithm that takes input
state σ, applies a quantum operation E before applying the
POVM {Πk}, where the set of final measurement results k ∈
S. These set of outcomes are then observed with probability
Pr(M(σ,ΠS) ∈ S) =
∑
k∈S Tr(ΠkE(σ)). By analogy with
Definition 1, we can write a definition of quantum differential
privacy following Zhou and Ying [44].
Definition 4 (Quantum differential privacy). The quantum al-
gorithmM satisfies (, δ)-quantum differential privacy if for
all input quantum states σ and ρ with τ(σ, ρ) < τD and for
all measurable sets S ⊆ Range(M) (equivalently, for every
ΠS ⊆ {Πk}max k=K−1k=0 )
Pr(M(ρ,ΠS) ∈ S) ≤ e Pr(M(σ,ΠS) ∈ S) + δ. (6)
For the rest of the paper, we focus on the case δ = 0, which
is referred to as -quantum differential privacy. To illustrate
a simple example, suppose we have a binary classification
problem where we choose the POVM {Π0,Π1 = 1 − Π0}.
The probability σ is assigned class labels k = 0, 1 by a quan-
tum binary classifier is y˜0(σ) ≡ Tr(Π0(E(σ)) and y˜1(σ) =
1− y˜0(σ) respectively. Then ifM satisfies -quantum differ-
ential privacy, Definition 4 requires that we must satisfy
e− ≤ y˜k(ρ)
y˜k(σ)
≤ e. (7)
III. IMPROVING ROBUSTNESS OF QUANTUM
CLASSIFIERS AGAINST ADVERSARIES BY ADDING
NOISE
In this section, we show how the presence of depolarisation
noise in quantum circuits for classification improves robust-
ness against adversarial examples. We begin with our defini-
tion of adversarial robustness.
4Definition 5 (Adversarial robustness). Let the test state σ
have the class label A(σ) under a classification algorithm A.
Then A is said to possess adversarial robustness of size τD
if for all σ that is perturbed σ → ρ by an unknown source
where τ(σ, ρ) ≤ τD, the class label of ρ does not change, i.e.,
A(ρ) = A(σ).
We must emphasise here the difference between robustness
bounds against a known noise source versus an unknown ad-
versary. Protection against an unknown adversary is a ro-
bustness guarantee against a worst-case scenario, whereas
commonly-appearing known noise sources are usually far
from the worst-case scenario.
Our goal is to demonstrate how a naturally-occurring
known noise source can be used to protect a quantum clas-
sifier against worst-case adversarial perturbations. This can
be done in three main steps. We first show the robustness of
quantum classifiers to this known noise source, then demon-
strate how this gives rise to quantum differential privacy for
the classifier. Finally we prove how quantum differential pri-
vacy can be used to derive a theoretical bound against general
adversaries.
One such naturally-occurring quantum noise source is
the depolarisation noise channel Np, which acts on a D-
dimensional state ΣD like
Np(ΣD) = p ID
D
+ (1− p)ΣD, (8)
where ID is the D ×D identity matrix and p ∈ [0, 1]. Before
the final measurement, we can represent our quantum classi-
fier as a unitary U gate acting on an input state σ ⊗ |a〉〈a|,
as represented in Fig. 1(a). We can then add Npi after each
unitary Ui where U = U1...Ul and i = 1, ..., l. Here l is the
total number of depolarisation channels with noise parameters
pi > 0. This noisy circuit is depicted in Fig. 1(b). The output
of this noisyK-multiclass classification circuit given test state
σ can be written as
y˜k(σ) ≡ Tr(ΠkNpl(Ul(...Np1(U1(σ ⊗ |a〉〈a|)U†1 )...)U†l )),
(9)
where it can be shown [45] that for p ≡ 1−∏li=1(1− pi)
y˜k(σ) =
p
K
+ (1− p)yk(σ). (10)
This leads to the interesting observation that the noisy test
score y˜k(σ) is independent of where depolarisation channels
are placed in the circuit. Furthermore, the effect of all depolar-
isation channels with parameters pi can be replaced by a sin-
gle depolarisation channel with parameter p ≡ 1−∏li=1(1−
pi). In the trivial case pi = 0 for all i, p = 0. For the rest of
this paper, we will for simplicity replace the effect of all noise
parameters pi with p unless stated otherwise.
Before achieveing our goal, we first need Eq. (10) to prove
the following lemma showing that theK-multiclass classifica-
tion algorithm performed by the noisy circuit is robust against
depolarisation noise for any 0 ≤ pi < 1. This is a generalisa-
tion of a recent result from LaRose and Coyle [46] to the case
of K-multiclass classification.
Lemma 1. Let yk(σ) denote the output for the noiseless cir-
cuit in Fig. 1(a), i.e., pi = 0 for all i. Then if the class
label C is assigned to σ by the noiseless circuit, i.e., C =
arg maxk yk(σ), then the same label is also assigned by the
noisy circuit, which has pi > 0 for at least one i. This means
arg maxk y˜k(σ) = C for any σ and 0 ≤ pi < 1. Further-
more, if arg maxk y˜k(σ) = C then C = arg maxk yk(σ).
Proof of Lemma 1. For details please see Appendix A.
The above result demonstrates robustness of quantum clas-
sifiers against depolarisation noise if one has access to the ex-
act probabilities y˜k(σ). However, this is only possible in the
limit of infinite sampling. If one is only able to sample the
circuit N times, one instead obtains only the estimated values
y˜
(N)
k (σ). Then to guarantee robustness against depolarisation
noise to high probability, we find the following required sam-
pling complexity N increases only with increasing depolari-
sation noise p, but is not dependent on the dimensionality of
σ.
Proposition 1. Let the predicted classification label of σ us-
ing the noiseless K-multiclass classification circuit be C.
This means we can define ξ ≡ yC(σ) − maxk 6=C yk(σ)
where ξ > 0. In the corresponding circuit with depolar-
isation noise parameters p1, ..., pl, one samples the circuit
N times for each k to obtain the estimates y˜(N)k (σ). Then
σ is also labelled C with probability at least β if the sam-
ple complexity N ∼ 1/(8ξ2(1 − p)2) ln(2/(1 − β)), where
p ≡ 1−∏li=1(1− pi).
Proof of Proposition 1. A basic sketch of the proof is the fol-
lowing. It can be shown that η ≡ y˜C(σ)−maxk 6=C y˜k(σ) =
pξ. Thus one requires sufficient N to resolve the difference
y˜
(N)
C (σ) − y˜(N)k (σ) to within 2η. We then employ Hoeffd-
ing’s inequality [29] to bound the sample complexity. Please
see Appendix B for details.
Now we show how adding depolarisation noise gives rise to
quantum differential privacy for our algorithm. This is an ap-
plication of a result from Zhou and Ying [44] for our quantum
classifier.
Lemma 2. Let the algorithm M correspond to the K-
multiclass classification circuit defined in Fig. 1(b) with de-
polarisation noise channels Npi , where i = 1, ..., l and p ≡
1−∏li=1(1−pi), and measurement operators {Πk}Kk=1. Then
for two quantum test states σ and ρ obeying τ(σ, ρ) ≤ τD
with 0 ≤ τD ≤ 1,M satisfies -quantum differential privacy
where
 = ln
(
1 +Dmeas
(1− p)τD
p
)
(11)
and Dmeas ≥ K is the dimension of the operators {Πk}Kk=1.
Proof of Lemma 2. This is equivalent to Theorem 3 from [44]
applied to our quantum classifier, but we extend to the case
where we can apply multiple depolarisation channelsNpi . For
details please see Appendix C.
5Lemma 2 states that the privacy budget  in the presence
of depolarisation noise decreases with increasing p ≡ 1 −∏l
i=1(1 − pi), hence higher depolarisation noise parameters
gives greater differential privacy. Furthermore, this privacy is
independent of where one inserts depolarisation noise because
the product
∏l
i=1(1−pi) is invariant under permutation of its
factors. It is also independent of any details of the classifier
except Dmeas, which serves as an upper-bound to the number
of class labels in our classifier. We will return to these points
later.
Using the results of Lemmas 1 and 2, the following theorem
demonstrates that by increasing the strength of depolarisation
noise in our circuit, this also increases our K-multiclass clas-
sifier’s robustness against adversarial examples.
Theorem 1 (Infinite sampling case). We begin with our K-
multiclass classification circuit with depolarisation noise pa-
rameters pi where i = 1, ..., l and p ≡ 1 −
∏l
i=1(1 − pi).
Let infinite sampling of the output be allowed, so we can find
y˜k(ρ) for k = 0, ...,K − 1 for any test state ρ given. Sup-
pose y˜C(σ) > e
2 maxk 6=C y˜k(σ) holds, where  = ln(1 +
Dmeas(1 − p)τD/p), which implies that σ is assigned the
class label C, i.e., C = arg maxk y˜k(σ) = arg maxk yk(σ).
Then ρ is also labelled as C, i.e., C = arg maxk y˜k(ρ) =
arg maxk yk(ρ) for any ρ where τ(σ, ρ) ≤ τD.
Proof of Theorem 1. Please refer to Appendix D for the proof.
This means that if a test state σ undergoes an arbitrary
adversarial perturbation σ → ρ, the classification of ρ will
remain identical to that of σ for a larger range of τ(σ, ρ)
if p increases. Furthermore, if τD remains constant, then
the extra condition required of the input state y˜C(σ) >
e2 maxj 6=C y˜j(σ) also becomes easier to satisfy as p in-
creases. A similar result holds for the finite sampling case.
Theorem 2 (Finite sampling case). Suppose one samples
the output of the circuit N times for the estimation of each
y˜k(σ). Let y˜
(N)
C (σ)− ζ > e2 maxk 6=C(y˜(N)k (σ) + ζ) where
 = ln(1 + Dmeas(1 − p)τD/p), which implies σ has the
class label C. Then the class label of ρ is also C, i.e.,
C = arg maxk yk(ρ) = arg maxk y˜k(ρ) to probability at
least 1− 2 exp(−2Nζ2) for any ρ where τ(σ, ρ) ≤ τD. This
also implies y˜(N)C (ρ) + ζ > maxk 6=C y˜
(N)
k (ρ) − ζ to proba-
bility at least 1− 2 exp(−2Nζ2).
Proof of Theorem 2. We employ Hoeffding’s inequality [29]
to show y˜(N)k (σ)− ζ ≤ y˜k(σ) ≤ y˜(N)k (σ) + ζ is true to prob-
ability at least 1 − 2 exp(−2Nζ2). This relates the finitely
sampled estimates y˜(N)k (σ) to y˜k(σ) from infinite sampling.
Then we can apply the results of Theorem 1 for infinite sam-
pling to prove our results. Please see Appendix E for details
of the proof.
As special examples, we now explore the robustness prop-
erty of two discriminative learning models for binary classi-
fication: quantum neural network and quantum kernel classi-
fiers.
FIG. 2: Noiseless and noisy QNN circuits. (a) The basic scheme
of QNN (noiseless). The trainable unitary U(θ) (yellow region)
is composed of the product of parameterised single-qubit gates and
fixed two-qubit gates Ui(θi) where i = 1, ...,m′′ and in the diagram
above 1 ≤ m ≤ n ≤ m′ ≤ m′′ ≤ nl where l is the depth of the
circuit and n = log2D. The test state is σ and the ancilla state is |a〉.
(b) Our protocol for QNN (noisy) where the depolarisation channels
Npi (pink region) are added to the noiseless QNN circuit.
A. Quantum neural network
The quantum neural network (QNN), proposed by [10],
is a building block for various quantum learning models
[3, 6, 10, 17, 19, 35]. The basic scheme of QNN is illus-
trated in Figure 2 (a), which is a special case of the cir-
cuit in Fig. 1(a). The D-dimensional quantum input state is
σ ⊗ |a〉〈a|, where σ refers to either the training or test states
and |a〉 is an ancilla. The trainable unitary U(θ) ∈ CD×D
is then applied, which consists of trainable single-qubit gates
and fixed two-qubit gates. Our protocol for QNN, as shown
in Figure 2 (b), employs the depolarisation channels Npi that
can appear within the QNN circuit before final measurements
with POVM {Πk}.
The typical application of QNN is for binary classification,
broadly used in [3, 6, 10, 19], where one makes single-qubit
measurements using {Π0,Π1 = 1−Π0} andDmeas = 2. We
can apply Theorem 1 directly to our scenario and we have the
following corollary.
Corollary 1. Let the given input σ be given the classifica-
tion label ‘0’ and define y˜0(σ)/y˜1(σ) ≡ B. In binary
classification, QNN, with depolarisation channels Npi and
p ≡ 1 −∏li=1(1 − pi), is robust against any perturbations
σ → ρ with τ(σ, ρ) < τD and  = ln(1 + 2(1− p)τD/p), if
B > exp(2) . (12)
Since Dmeas = 2 for binary classification, we note that
the privacy budget  is now independent of the dimension of
the problem. Therefore, even as the feature dimension of the
input σ grows, it does not affect the robustness of the classifier
against adversarial examples so long as some depolarisation
noise with 0 < p < 1 has been added to the circuit. This
independence is an interesting contrast to the result in [24]
which states that robustness should decrease as dimensionality
of σ grows. This contradiction is resolved by observing that,
unlike in [24] which places no constraints on distribution from
6which the input states σ are selected, here we have Eq. (12)
which imposes a constraint.
In the finite sampling limit, we can employ Theorem 2 to
apply to our binary classifier and we have the following corol-
lary.
Corollary 2. Let the input σ be given the classification label
‘0’ and define (y˜(N)0 (σ)− ζ)/(y˜(N)1 (σ) + ζ) ≡ B, where the
probabilities are estimated using N samples of the quantum
circuit. Then if
B > exp(2) , (13)
the binary classification performed by the QNN circuit, with
depolarisation channels Npi and p ≡ 1 −
∏l
i=1(1 − pi), is
robust to adversarial attacks σ → ρ with the probability at
least 1−2 exp (−2Nζ2) where τ(ρ, σ) ≤ τD and  = ln(1+
2(1− p)τD/p).
B. Quantum kernel classifier
FIG. 3: Noiseless and noisy quantum kernel classifiers. (a) A
basic scheme of the quantum kernel classifier. The unitary V (x)
(green region) takes |0〉⊗n → V (x)|0〉⊗n, where n = log2D.
The trainable unitaryW (θ) (yellow region) is composed of trainable
single-qubit gates and fixed two qubits gates, which has the same ar-
chitecture as in QNN. For example, at the end we can measure in
the basis |0〉⊗n and this circuit can be used to compute the kernel
K(θ,x) ≡ 〈0|⊗nW (θ)V (x)|0〉⊗n. (b) For our protocol, we can
include depolarisation noise channels Npi (pink region) anywhere
along the quantum kernel classifier.
The main idea of kernel methods is to map complex in-
put data x to a higher-dimensional feature space that can
then be efficiently separated [13]. The generic form of a
quantum kernel classifier [17, 28, 37] is shown in Figure
3. The output of the kernel classifier can be written as
K(θ,x) ≡ 〈0|⊗nW (θ)V (x)|0〉⊗n, where K(θ,x) is iden-
tified with a classical kernel with test state x and weight
vector captured by the trained θ values. Here W (θ) con-
tains the trainable parameters with the aim of minimizing the
predefined loss function where the optimal occurs at θ∗ and
V (x)|0〉⊗n refers to the kernel state that maps the input data
into the higher-dimensional feature space. Thus the proba-
bility of obtaining the measurement values all ‘0’ after ap-
plying Π0 ≡ (|0〉〈0|)⊗n in the noiselss circuit is given by
y0(x) = 〈0|⊗nW (θ∗)V (x)|0〉⊗n.
For a binary classification problem, the class label of x is 0
if y0(x) > y1(x) ≡ 1 − y0(x). In this case, Dmeas = D,
thus the privacy budget becomes  = ln(1 +D(1− p)τD/p).
which grows with increasing dimensionality D of the input
state. Corollaries 1 and 2 then hold for the quantum kernel
classifier with this modified .
IV. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
We now conduct numerical simulations to illustrate our pro-
tocol for a binary QNN classifier. In particular, by leveraging
the depolarisation channel, we show how a trained QNN bi-
nary classifier has the ability to achieve certified robustness
under bounded-norm adversarial attacks at testing time. In
this section, we first introduce our training dataset and the
preprocessing step. We then explain the attack method that
is used to evaluate the performance of our protocol. Lastly we
analyse the performance of our proposed protocol.
A. Preprocessing and training procedure
We choose to conduct our numerical simulations on the Iris
dataset [11], which has been broadly used in classical machine
learning. The Iris datasetDI = {σi, c∗i }150i=1 ∈ R150×4×R150
consists of three different types of Iris flowers (Setosa, Versi-
colour, and Virginica), where examples (belonging to Setosa)
with label c∗i = 0 are linearly separable with respect to exam-
ples (belonging to Versicolour) with label c∗i = 1.
Next, we remove all examples belonging to Virginica and
denote the dataset that only contains label c∗i = 0 and c
∗
i = 1
as D, i.e., the cardinality of D is 100. Then we set the fourth
entry of all examples as 0. Afterwards, we apply l2 normal-
ization to each example, i.e., ‖σi‖2 = 1 for any σi ∈ D. Then
we need to efficiently encode this classical data into quantum
states [36]. We can then carry out the amplitude encoding
method [30] to encode the normalized σi into a quantum state.
Given the preprocessed dataset D, we randomly split it
into a training dataset DTr and a test dataset DTe with n ≡
|DTr| = 60, |DTe| = 40, and D = DTr ∪ DTe. In the train-
ing procedure, we randomly sample an example (σi, c∗i ) from
DTr and forward σi to a binary QNN classifier. For details
on the circuit see Appendix H. We employ the squared loss
function to train this QNN, i.e.,
L = 1
n
n∑
i=1
(c∗i − c¯i)2 , (14)
where c¯i = maxk yk(σi) ∈ [0, 1] is the score vector of QNN
as formulated in Subsection II A and yk(σ) denotes the ideal
output of the QNN.
We use the zeroth-order gradient method [28] to optimize
trainable parameters θ of the QNN to minimize the loss func-
tion L. We set the number of training epochs to 50. The
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FIG. 4: The blue, red, and orange lines respectively show the varia-
tion of loss, the training accuracy, and the test accuracy with respect
to the number of epochs. The loss continuously decreases for longer
epochs, while the training accuracy and test accuracy increases and
converges sharply around epoch 5.
learning rate is set to 0.01 and the total number of trainable
parameters is 24. Figure 4 illustrates the training loss, train-
ing accuracy and test accuracy. Both the training and test ac-
curacy converges to 100% after 15 epochs (See Appendix H
for more implementation details). Given the test dataset DTe,
we randomly select three test examples and explore how the
maximum robustness τD changes with varied p according to
Eq. (11), which we can rewrite as
τD =
(e − 1)p
Dmeas(1− p) . (15)
Figure 5 illustrates how τD scales with different p for three
different test examples with Dmeas = 2. Note that the con-
stants  are different for the three test examples and the test
examples satisfy the condition in Eq. (12). In the same figure,
we also plot how the test score y˜0(σ) varies with p, coming
from Eq. (10) for the case of binary classification K = 2
y˜k(σ) = p/2 + (1− p)yk(σ). (16)
B. Evaluation metrics and adversarial attack methods
To evaluate the performance of our protocol, we adopt an
adversarial attack method that is widely employed in classi-
cal machine learning. It is known as the iterative-fast gradient
sign method (I-FGSM) with l2-bounded norm [7, 25, 27] that
aims to attack the test dataset DTe to make incorrect predic-
tions when using a trained classifier. If we denote the original
input by x and the adversarial example at the tth updating step
when using the I-FGSM by x′(t), then
x′(0) = x
x′(t+1) = x′(t) + α · sign(∇xL), (17)
where α = L/T is the learning rate with ‖x− x′‖2 ≤ L and
L is the loss function formulated in Eq. (14).
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FIG. 5: For three different test examples, we see how the simulated
results for robustness τD and test scores y˜0(σ) varies with respect to
p. All three test examples have label 0, where the test score is above
the blue dotted line. The closed-form expressions for the variation of
τD and y˜0(σ) are shown in Eqs. (15) and (16).
C. Adversarial attack at test time
Here we employ our trained classifier and the adversarial
attack method formulated above to quantify the performance
of our protocol. Recall that Corollaries 1 and 2 are the special
cases of Theorems 1 and 2 when applied to binary QNN clas-
sifiers and work in the regime of using infinite and finite sam-
pling of the output probabilities respectively. Here we explore
how our protocol protects the binary QNN classifier against
adversarial attacks under these two settings.
The infinite sampling case. At testing time, we randomly
sample an example (ρ = |x〉〈x|, y˜) fromDTe to investigate its
robustness τD with respect to different level of depolarisation
noise p. Without loss of generality, the original test example
has label y˜ = 0. We set three different values of p and τD:
{p(1) = 0.5, τ (1)D = 0.02}; {p(2) = 0.1, τ (1)D = 0.02} and
{p(1) = 0.5, τ (2)D = 0.2}. From Eq. (11), their corresponding
privacy budgets are 1 = 1.04, 2 = 1.36 and 3 = 1.4.
Given our input ρ, the outputs of our trained classifier with
added depolarizsation noise are Pr(y˜(1)(ρ) = 0) = 54.46%,
Pr(y˜(2)(ρ) = 0) = 58.04% and Pr(y˜(3)(ρ) = 0) = 54.46%,
where the corresponding constants B defined in Corollary 1
is B(1) = 1.20, B(2) = 1.38, and B(3) = 1.20, respectively.
Following the condition for robustness in Eq. (12), we have
confidence that the classifier is robust to adversarial attacks if
B > e2. A simple comparison indicates that robustness is
guaranteed when {p = 0.5, τD = 0.02}, since B(1) > e21 =
1.08 while B(2) < e22 = 1.85 and B(3) < e23 = 1.96.
To validate the correctness of our theoretical results, we em-
ploy I-FGSM to attack our trained classifier, where we iden-
tify the l2-norm bound with its corresponding τD value. The
left panel of Figure 6 demonstrates the simulation results and
Table I shows the final test score of the attacked input. The
classifier with the first setting {p(1) = 0.5, τ (1)D = 0.02}
is robust to the bounded-norm adversarial attacks, where the
predicted label of x˜ is still ‘0’. For the third setting when
{p(3) = 0.5, τ (3)D = 0.2}, the adversary can easily perturb the
8Infinite Precision Case (nsamp =∞) p = 0, τD = 0 p(1), τ (1)D p(2), τ (1)D p(1), τ (2)D
y˜0(ρ) 58.92% (label 0) 52.96% (label 0) 57.11% (label 0) 49.42% (label 1)
Finite Precision Case (p(1), τ (1)D ) — nsamp = 50 nsamp = 500 nsamp = 5000
y˜0(ρ) — 44.32% (label 1) 55.80% (label 0) 53.88% (label 0)
TABLE I: We list the test scores of the selected test example {ρ, y˜} after bounded-norm adversarial attacks in both the infinite and finite
sampling cases. The parameters p = 0, τD = 0 refers to the test score under in the absence of any depolarisation noise in the circuit. The
other parameter settings are {p(1) = 0.5, τ (1)D = 0.02}, {p(2) = 0.1, τ (1)D = 0.02} and {p(1) = 0.5, τ (2)D = 0.2}.
input and lead the classifier to give the wrong prediction. In
particular, the adversary can easily perturb the input to cross
the classification boundary, as highlighted by the purple line.
For the second setting with {p(2) = 0.1, τ (2)D = 0.05}, the
classifier correctly predicts the label, while our protocol can-
not provide any promises, since Theorem 1 and Corollary 1
provides only sufficient conditions for robustness. The above
three simulation results are then in accordance with our theo-
retical results.
The finite sampling case. The only difference in the finite
sampling case is the acquisition of the output of our trained
classifier. The same test example (ρ = |x〉〈x|, y˜) is employed.
The hyperparameters are set as {p(1) = 0.5, τ (1)D = 0.02} and
from Eq. (11), the privacy budget  = 1.04 is fixed. We set
three different sampling number values nsamp to explore how
nsamp affects the robustness guarantees, where n
(1)
samp = 50,
n
(2)
samp = 500, and n
(3)
samp = 5000. The corresponding
three approximated test scores are Pr(y˜(1) = 0) = 0.515,
Pr(y˜(2) = 0) = 0.529 and Pr(y˜(3) = 0) = 0.552. The corre-
sponding parameters B are B(1) = 1.06, B(2) = 1.124, and
B(3) = 1.23 with respect to n(1)samp, n
(2)
samp, and n
(3)
samp. Fol-
lowing the results of Theorem 2 and Corollary 2, with prob-
ability at least 1 − 2 exp (−2nsampζ2), the trained classifier
with added depolarisation noise is robust to adversarial attacks
if B > e2. By setting ζ = 0.95, a simple inspection shows
that nsamp = 5000 guarantees robustness. Analogous to the
infinite sampling case, we employ a bounded-norm adversary
to confirm the correctness of our theory result, where the sim-
ulation results are shown in the right panel of Figure 6.
For more details on the implementation of the classifier and
perfomance analysis of our protocol please see Appendix H.
V. ADVANTAGES OF PROTOCOL
Adversarial settings naturally occur when data needs to be
delegated to different parties, for instance in a client-server
setting and in multiparty computing. When this data is in
the form of quantum states before processing using a quan-
tum classifier, our protocol currently provides the only exisit-
ing method to protect the general quantum classifier against
arbitrary adversarial examples and also includes a theoreti-
cally provable bound. Furthermore, it can take advantage of
certain exisiting quantum noise in a quantum classifier, like
depolarisation noise, to provide protection against adversar-
ial examples thus obviating the need for error-correction or
error-mitigation if no other noise sources are present. More-
over, even if the test score is diminished in presence of depo-
larisation noise, its original value in the absence of any quan-
tum noise can be retrieved by simply increasing the number of
times one samples from the classifier. This sample complex-
ity increases with the amount of exisiting depolarisation noise
and is independent of the dimension of the state itself.
Utilizing quantum noise like depolarisation noise also has
certain advantages over classical methods for classical data in
improving robustness against adversarial examples. We dis-
cuss this below.
A. Comparison to the best known classical protocol
While in the quantum case the theoretical bound on robust-
ness is independent of the details of the classification model
and is simple to compute, this is not true in the best known
classical protocol. Before elaborating on this quantum advan-
tage, we briefly review the classical results.
Following the results of [23], classical -differential privacy
of a classification algorithm is obtained by adding noise sam-
pled from the Laplacian distribution N (z, κ) to the trained
classifier. This is commonly known as the Laplace mecha-
nism. For numerical functions [47], the only other common
method to attain differential privacy is the Gaussian mecha-
nism, which adds noise sampled from the Gaussian distribu-
tion. However, this leads to classical (, δ)-differential privacy
where δ 6= 0, so cannot be directly compared to our quantum
scenario where δ = 0. The Laplacian distribution used in the
Laplace mechanism can be written as
N (z, κ) =
√
2
2κ
exp
(−|z|√
2κ
)
,with κ =
∆fL

, (18)
where κ refers to the variance of the Laplacian distribution and
L is the upper-bounded l2 norm between original input x and
attacked input x′ such that classical -differential privacy is
preserved. The sensitivity ∆f of the function f(·) applied at a
layer of the neural network classifier just before the Laplacian
noise is injected is defined as
∆f = max
x,x′
||f(x)− f(x′)||2/||x− x′||2. (19)
The classical protocol runs in the following way. In the test-
ing phase, the adversarial example x′, where ‖x − x′‖2 ≤ L
and x is the original test example, is inserted into the trained
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FIG. 6: The robustness of our protocol to adversarial examples. (Left) The left panel illustrates a bounded-norm attack on the Iris dataset in
the infinite sampling case. The inner and outer circle regions indicate the robustness values τ (1)D = 0.02 and τ
(2)
D = 0.2 respectively. The thick
purple line is a trained hyperplane of our QNN classifier. The dotted arrows indicate how an adversary iteratively attacks the input ρ under
three different settings of {p(1) = 0.5, τ (1)D = 0.02}; {p(2) = 0.1, τ (1)D = 0.02} and {p(1) = 0.5, τ (2)D = 0.2}, where the aim of the adversary
is to induce the classifier to output the wrong prediction. The inner plot enlarges the part of the central figure near the test example. (Right)
The right panel illustrates the bounded-norm attack in the finite precision case. The circle region indicates the robustness value τ (1)D = 0.02
and p(1) = 0.5. The dotted arrows indicate the path of an adversary that iteratively attacks the input under nsamp = 50, 500 and 5000, where
the adversary aims to induce the classifier to output the wrong prediction. The inner plot enlarges the part of the central figure near the test
example.
classifier y(·). The predicted label for x′ is obtained by in-
voking y(x′) a total N times. For every run of y(x′), the
noise zi,j with i = 1, ..., N is independently sampled from
NL(z, κ) and applied to the input to some layer j of the neu-
ral network realising the classifier. Let Nk denote the number
of times that the predicted label is k, so the probability of the
predicted label being k is given by Nk/N . Then, similarly to
Theorem 2, we can write the following condition for robust-
ness of the K-class classifier under the Laplace mechanism.
Lemma 3 (modified from [23]). Let x be the input to the
K-multiclass classifier, which is endowed with classical -
differential privacy under the Laplace mechanism, with  =
∆fL/κ, as formulated in Eq. (18). Let C be the label of x.
Then with probability at least 1− ζ, the classifier is robust to
any adversarial example x′ with ‖x− x′‖2 ≤ L if
L =
κ
∆f
<
κ
2∆f
ln

NC
N −
√
1
2N ln
(
2
1−ζ
)
maxk 6=C NkN +
√
1
2N ln
(
2
1−ζ
)
 .
(20)
This means that this best available classical theoretical
bound to L depends on ∆f , which in general is dependent on
both the details of the classification model used and the layer
of the neural network in which the Laplacian noise is injected.
However, in the quantum scenario with depolarisation noise,
we see that the robustness bound is independent of both U , the
circuit realising the quantum classifier, as well as the location
or locations of noise injection. This means that the adversarial
robustness bound is universal for all quantum classifiers.
We can see this from the fact that the final state of the quan-
tum circuit after applying depolarisation noise in layers 1 to l
depends only on the product
∏l
i=1(1− pi), which is indepen-
dent of U and invariant under any re-ordering of the layers.
This simplicity in the quantum case results from two facts:
that the ‘noisy’ part of depolarisation noise lies in injecting a
maximally-mixed channel with a certain probability and that
unitary U operations realising any quantum classifier are uni-
tal (i.e., the identity operator 1 remains invariant under U ).
On the other hand, there is no known classical equivalent of
this property that also gives rise to differential privacy.
The dependence of ∆f on the details of the classifier in the
most general cases also leads to a difficulty in the computa-
tion of ∆f and is often intractable except in the simplest cases
[23]. This means that, unlike in the quantum case, the corre-
sponding classical bound on robustness L cannot be derived
in closed form from Eq. (20) in the most general case.
However, in special simple cases we can provide quanti-
tative examples of this quantum advantage. As a simple il-
lustration, we can look at the binary classifier for the kernel
perceptron, which can be written as
y(x) =
(
y0(x)
1− y0(x)
)
, y0(x) =
M∑
i=1
w∗i y
∗
iK(x
∗
i ,x), (21)
where {(x∗i , y∗i )}Mi=1 are the M training examples and
{w∗i }Mi=1 are trained parameters of the classifier. We can con-
sider the polynomial kernel
K(x∗i ,x) = (x
∗
i · x)n, (22)
where n is the kernel degree and n = 1 is the special case of
the linear kernel. We now have the following theorem.
Theorem 3. We have a binary classifier y(x) = (y0(x), 1−
y0(x))
T where y0(x) =
∑M
i=1 w
∗
i yiK(x
∗
i ,x) with the poly-
nomial kernel K(x∗i ,x) = (x
∗
i · x)n. Let x denote all
correctly labelled test examples. We now implement the
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Laplace mechanism in this classifier where the sensitivity is
∆f ≡ ||y(x) − y(x′)||2/||x − x′||2 and the privacy budget
is  = ∆fL/κ. Let us choose y˜0(x) > exp(2)y˜1(x) and
define B ≡ y0(x)/y1(x). We can define the function g(·) for
our noisy classifier where g(B) = y˜0(x)/y˜1(x). Then the
classifier is robust under any adversarial example x′ where
||x− x′||2 ≤ L and
L ≤ 1
M
κ
2
√
2nmax{|w∗i yi|}Mi=1
ln g(B). (23)
Proof of Theorem 3. We compute an upper-bound for ∆f in
terms of classification model parameters in y(x) and use
L = κ/∆f < κ ln g(B)/(2∆f). Please see Appendix C
for details.
From this we see that we can guarantee only a smaller ro-
bustness bound for a more nonlinear kernel (i.e., higher n).
We can also use a quantum classifier below to realise the same
polynomial kernel and find a robustness bound that is now in-
dependent of degree of nonlinearity of the kernel.
Theorem 4. We have a kernel perceptron binary classifier
y(σ) = (y0(σ),y1(σ) = 1 − y0(σ))T that is realised by a
quantum circuit in the absence of noise and takes the form in
Figure 2 with Dmeas = 2. Without losing generality, we can
assume the class label of σ is 0. Now we add depolarisation
noise channelsNpi to the classifier where i = 1, ..., l to create
a noisy classifier y˜(σ). Let us choose y˜0(σ) > exp(2)y˜1(σ)
and define B ≡ y0(σ)/y1(σ). Then the noisy classifier is
robust under any adversarial perturbation σ → ρ such that
τ(σ, ρ) ≤ τD where
τD <
B − 1
4(B + 1) + 8(1− p)/p (24)
for p = 1− p ∈ (0, 1/2) and
τ2D <
B − 1
4(B + 1)(1− p)/p+ 8(1− p)2/p2 (25)
for p = 1− p ∈ [1/2, 1).
Proof of Theorem 4. We use the expression for -quantum dif-
ferential privacy with depolarisation noise that relates τD with
 and relate  to the fraction B. Please see Appendix G for de-
tails.
The trace distance τD can be turned into a corresponding
l2 norm distance L if an encoding of the classical data x into
a quantum state σx is chosen. For instance, we can choose
the most widely used amplitude encoding x → ∑Di=1 xi|i〉
where xi is the ith element of x and we assume for sim-
plicity the normalisation ||x||2 = 1. Then the trace dis-
tance τ(σx, σx′) =
√
1− Tr(σxσx′) =
√
1− (x · x′)2 and
l2 ≡ ||x − x′||2 =
√
2− 2(x · x′). Therefore we can write
τ(σx, σx′) = l2
√
1− l22/2 ≥ l2. This means Theorem 4 still
holds if we replace τD withL and can compare results directly
with Theorem 3 with the same chosen constant B. Then we
see how the robustness bound in the classical case is depen-
dent on details of the kernel function like the nonlinearity n
whereas the robustness bound can be completely independent
of the kernel function.
While in Theorems 3 and 4 we have provided only suffi-
cient though not necessary conditions for robustness, this was
only for the purpose of illustrating a clearer interpretation of
robustness in terms of a model parameter like the degree of
nonlinearly n. Necessary conditions can also be found since
we already have the exact expressions for L and τD. We know
that the former is dependent on the details of the classification
model through ∆f in the most general case whereas the latter
is dependent only on p, Dmeas and , which can be chosen
to be constants independent of the details of the kernel or any
other classifier. This latter property of τD we have already
learned is not consistent with any known classical mechanism
for differential privacy.
Another advantage of the quantum mechanism is that de-
polarisation noise can occur naturally in quantum systems es-
pecially for NISQ devices, whereas the Laplace mechanism
needs to be artifically injected into the classifier. From [44] it
is known that other quantum noise like amplitude and phase
damping and generalised amplitude damping also have the -
quantum differential privacy property in the single-qubit case.
It remains exciting work for future investigation to see in the
general multiqubit case if other natural sources of quantum
noise can be harnessed for adversarial protection.
VI. DISCUSSION
We demonstrated how depolarisation noise placed any-
where in a quantum circuit used for classification can be ex-
ploited to protect the classification algorithm against arbitrary
‘worst-case’ attacks like adversarial examples. A theoretical
bound for robustness can be proved without any assumptions
on the type of adversary or the classification model and ap-
plies to both quantum and classical data. This bound relies
on a new relationship we introduced between quantum differ-
ential privacy and adversarial robustness in the quantum set-
ting. In particular, depolarisation noise allows the theoreti-
cal robustness bound to be dependent only on the number of
classes in the classification model and no other feature of the
classifier. However, all known classical noise that can give
rise to differential privacy results in robustness bounds that
would generally depend on more details of the classification
model, for instance the degree of nonlinearity of the classifi-
cation boundary.
This result raises many intriguing possibilities for explor-
ing other naturally-occuring quantum noise sources that could
offer similar advantages against adversarial attacks, which be-
come pertinent concerns as quantum data are shared in a fu-
ture quantum internet. We see that the fruitful merging of con-
cepts in security and quantum machine learning potentially
leads to quantum advantages that is independent of quantum
speedups. This also highlights how noise in the NISQ era for
quantum computation can be used as a positive feature and
can be employed in parallel with other methods to demon-
11
strate quantum advantage.
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Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 1
Here we prove that if the noiseless quantum classifier as-
signs σ to the class C, i.e., C = arg maxk yk(σ), then
the noisy circuit with depolarisation noise also assigns σ to
the class C, i.e. C = arg maxk y˜k(σ). This is equiva-
lent to the condition that if yC(σ) > maxk 6=C yk(σ), then
y˜C(σ) > maxk 6=C y˜k(σ).
Using Eq. (8)
Np(σ) = p
D
ID + (1− p)σ, (A1)
we can rewrite Eq. (9) as
y˜k(σ) ≡ Tr(ΠkNpl(UL(...Np1(U1(σ ⊗ |a〉〈a|)U†1 )...)))
= Tr(Πkp
I
D
) + (1− p)yk(σ)
=
p
K
+ (1− p)yk(σ), (A2)
where k = 1, 2, ...,K and p ≡ 1−∏li=1(1− pi). The second
line can be readily derived by induction. Then if yC(σ) >
maxk 6=C yk(σ), Eq. (A2) implies
y˜C(σ) =
p
K
+ (1− p)yC(σ)
>
p
K
+ (1− p) max
k 6=C
yk(σ)
= max
k 6=C
( p
K
+ (1− p)yk(σ)
)
= max
k 6=C
y˜k(σ). (A3)
Conversely, if y˜C(σ) > maxk 6=C y˜k(σ), then from Eq. (A2)
it is clear that yC(σ) > maxk 6=C yk(σ) is true also.
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1
From Lemma 1, we know that if σ is labelled as C in the
noiseless circuit then in the infinite sampling limit this label
is maintained in the corresponding circuit with depolarisation
noise, so y˜C(σ) > maxk 6=C y˜k(σ). However, in the finite
sampling limit with sample complexity N , we only have ac-
cess to the estimate y˜(N)k (σ). So we want to find the smallest
N so y˜(N)C (σ) > maxk 6=C y˜
(N)
k (σ) with probability at least
β.
From results in Lemma 1, we see that since y˜k(σ) =
1−p/K+pyk(σ) and ξ ≡ yC(σ)−maxk 6=C yk(σ), then η ≡
y˜C −maxk 6=C y˜k(σ) = pξ. Thus we need large enough sam-
pling to resolve the difference y˜(N)C (σ)−maxk 6=C y˜(N)k (σ) to
at least 2η = 2pξ. It is then sufficient to find N that estimates
y˜
(N)
k (σ) to precision 2η. To find N , we can employ Hoeffd-
ing’s inequality in the following.
Lemma A. (Hoeffding’s inequality [29]) LetZ1, ..., ZN be in-
dependent bounded random variables with Zi ∈ [a, b] for all
i ∈ [N ], where −∞ < a ≤ b <∞. Then the probability
Pr
(∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
i=1
Zi − E(Zi)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ζ
)
≥ 1− 2 exp
(
− 2Nζ
2
(b− a)2
)
.
(B1)
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In our case, we can use b− a = 1, ζ = 2η, (1/N)∑Ni=1 Zi =
y˜
(N)
k (σ) and E(Zi) = y˜k(σ). Thus if we require the prob-
ability Pr(|y˜(N)k (σ) − yk(σ)| < 2η) ≥ β, it is sufficient to
require 1− 2 exp(−8N(1− p)2ξ2) ∼ β, or eequivalently
N ∼ 1
8(1− p)2ξ2 ln
(
2
1− β
)
. (B2)
Appendix C: Proof of Lemma 2
This proof follows Zhou and Ying [44], applied to the case
where the dimension of the final projector is Dmeas and we
can apply multiple depolarisation channelsNpi for i = 1, ..., l
where p ≡ 1−∏li=1(1− pi). To show -differential privacy,
we must show that when τ(σ, ρ) ≤ τD, the following relation
must hold, i.e.,
e− ≤ y˜k(ρ)
y˜k(σ)
≤ e, (C1)
where from Eq. (9)
y˜k(ρ) = Tr(Πk(Npl(Ul(...Np1(U1(ρ)U†1 )...U†l )))). (C2)
By employing the definition of depolarisation noise with noise
parameter p acting on an arbitrary quantum state σ, from
Eq. (8)
Np(σ) = p
D
ID + (1− p)σ, (C3)
we can derive
y˜k(ρ) =
p(D −Dmeas)
D
Tr(Πk)
+ (1−)pTr(ID−Dmeas ⊗ΠkU(ρ)U†), (C4)
and similarly for y˜k(σ). From this we can write
y˜k(ρ)
y˜k(σ)
− 1 =
(1− p)Tr(U(ρ− σ)U†)ID−Dmeas ⊗Πk)/(
p(D −Dmeas)
D
Tr(Πk) + F
)
≤ (1− p)τDTr(ID−Dmeas ⊗Πk)
p(D−Dmeas)
D Tr(Πk)
=
1− p
p
DmeasτD , (C5)
where F ≡ (1 − p)Tr(ID−Dmeas ⊗ ΠkU(σ)U†) > 0. In the
first inequality we used the relation Tr(U(ρ − σ)U†Λk) ≤
τDTr(Λk) and the inequality τ(U(σ)U†, U(ρ)U†) ≤
τ(σ, ρ) ≤ τD [31, 44].
To satisfy Eq. (C2), we upper-bound this final term by e−1
and find the privacy budget
1− p
p
DmeasτD ≤ e − 1
⇒ = ln
(
1 +DmeasτD
1− p
p
)
. (C6)
Appendix D: Proof of Theorem 1
Here we prove that if y˜k(σ) > e
2 maxk 6=C y˜k(σ) where
 = ln(1+Dmeas(1−p)τD/p), then y˜C(ρ) > maxk 6=C y˜k(ρ)
for all ρ where τ(σ, ρ) ≤ τD. First we employ Lemma 2,
which states that given depolarisation noise with parameter p,
the algorithm implemented by the noisy circuit has -quantum
differential privacy. Then from Eq. (7) following Definition 4,
we see that in our case it states
e− ≤ y˜k(ρ)
y˜k(σ)
≤ e, (D1)
which holds true for when  = ln(1 + Dmeas(1 − p)τD/p)
and all ρ where τ(σ, ρ) ≤ τD. Then if we insert y˜k(σ) >
e2 maxk 6=C y˜k(σ) into the above we can write
y˜k(ρ) ≥ e−y˜k(σ) > e max
k 6=C
y˜k(σ). (D2)
Then the left-hand side inequality in Eq. (D1), we find
y˜k(ρ) ≥ max
k 6=C
y˜k(ρ). (D3)
From Lemma 1, we see that this is also equivalent to the claim
yk(ρ) ≥ maxk 6=C yk(ρ).
Appendix E: Proof of Theorem 2
From Hoeffding’s inequality (see Eq. (B1) in Lemma A of
Appendix B), it is clear that
y˜
(N)
k (σ)− ζ ≤ y˜k(σ) ≤ y˜(N)k (σ) + ζ (E1)
to probability greater than 1 − 2 exp(−2Nζ2). In the
statement of Theorem 2, we assume y˜(N)C (σ) − ζ >
e2 maxk 6=C(y˜
(N)
k (σ) + ζ). Inserting the above, this implies
y˜C(σ) ≥ y˜(N)C (σ)− ζ
> e2 max
k 6=C
(y˜
(N)
k (σ) + ζ) ≥ e2 max
k 6=C
y˜k(σ) (E2)
is true to probability at least 1 − 2 exp(−2Nζ2).
From Theorem 1 we know that the above inequality
y˜C(σ) > e
2 maxk 6=C y˜k(σ) leads to the condition
C = arg maxk y˜k(ρ) = arg maxk yk(σ) for all ρ where
τ(σ, ρ) ≤ τD and  = ln(1 +Dmeas(1− p)τD/p).
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Then using Eq. (E1) again in the condition C =
arg maxk y˜k(ρ), equivalent to y˜C(ρ) > maxk 6=C y˜k(ρ), we
find
y˜
(N)
C (σ) + ζ > max
k 6=C
y˜
(N)
k (σ) + ζ (E3)
to probability at least 1− 2 exp(−2Nζ2).
Appendix F: Proof of Theorem 3
We first observe that for integers n > 0 and numbers u and
v we have un− vn = (u− v)∑nj=0 ujvn−1−j . If we assume
|u|, |v| ≤ G, this then implies |un−vn| ≤ |u−v|nGn−1. Let
q(ui) = aiu
n
i so
|
M∑
i=1
q(ui)− q(vi)| ≤
M∑
i=1
|q(ui)− q(vi)|
≤
M∑
i=1
|ai||uni − vni | ≤
M∑
i=1
|ai||ui − vi|nGn−1i , (F1)
where all |ui|, |vi| ≤ Gi. In our case we can define ai = w∗i yi,
ui = x
∗
i · x, vi = x∗i · x′. Suppose we fix a normalisation
||x∗i ||2 = 1 = ||x||2 = |x′||2. From the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality, |ui| = |x∗i · x| ≤ ||x∗i ||2||x||2 = 1 and similarly
|vi| ≤ 1, so it is sufficient for us to choose Gi = 1. We
now want to compute the sensitivity for the kernel perceptron
model where the sensitivity is defined in Eq. (19)
∆f = max
x,x′
||f(x)− f(x′)||2/||x− x′||2, (F2)
where in our case of the polynomial kernel f(x) = y(x) =
(y0(x), 1−y0(x))T and y0(x) =
∑M
i=1 w
∗
i y
∗
i (x
∗
i ·x)n. Then
it is straightforward to show
∆f = max
x,x′
√
2
|∑Mi=1 w∗i y∗i (K(x∗i ,x)−K(x∗i ,x′))|
||x− x′||2 .
(F3)
Using Eq. (F1) for the polynomial kernel, we obtain
∆f ≤
M∑
i=1
|ai||ui − vi|
||x− x′||2 n =
M∑
i=1
|ai||x∗i · (x− x′i)|
||x− x′||2 n
≤
M∑
i=1
|ai|||x∗i ||2||x− x′i||2
||x− x′||2 n
=
M∑
i=1
|w∗i yi|n ≤M max{|w∗i yi|}Mi=1n, (F4)
where we used the normalisation ||x∗i ||2 = 1 in the last line.
In the special case of the linear kernel (or n = 1) we have
∆f ≤M max{|wyyi|}Mi=1.
From Eq. (18) in the text,
κ =
∆fL

. (F5)
This means that the classifier is robust against all ad-
versarial examples x′ where ||x′ − x||2 ≤ L =
κ/∆f . In our theorem, we require the condition g(B) ≡
y˜0()/y˜1(x) > exp(2) where B ≡ y0(x)/y1(x), which
gives  < (1/2) ln g(B). Together with 1/∆f ≥
1/(M max{|w∗i yi|}Mi=1n) from Eq. (F4), this implies ||x′ −
x||2 < κ ln g(B)/(2
√
2M max{|w∗i yi|}Mi=1n) is a sufficient
condition for robustness.
Appendix G: Proof of Theorem 4
Following the results of Lemma 1, when the depolarisation
noise layer is inserted into the trained model just before the
final measurement, the classifier y(σ) has the -differential
privacy property where
e−y˜0(σ) < y˜0(ρ) ≤ ey˜0(σ)
e−y˜1(σ) ≤ y˜1(ρ) ≤ ey˜1(σ). (G1)
Now, if the initial class label of σ is 0, to correctly predict the
attacked input ρ requires
y˜0(ρ) > y˜1(ρ) = 1− y˜0(ρ). (G2)
In combination with Eq. (G1), this robustness condition is
equivalent to (1 + e2)y˜(σ) > e2 or
y˜0(σ)/y˜1(σ) > e
2. (G3)
By including depolarisation channels with corresponding de-
polarisation parameters p1, ..., pl, we can write
y˜0(σ) = p/2 + (1− p)y0(σ), (G4)
where p = 1 − p. Then inserting Eq. (G4) into Eq. (G3) we
find
p
2
+ (1− p)y0(σ) > e2
(p
2
+ (1− p)y1(σ)
)
⇔
p
2 + (1− p)y0(σ)
p
2 + (1− p)y1(σ)
> e2
⇔1 + (1− p)(y0(σ)− y1(σ))p
2 + (1− p)y1(σ)
>
(
1 + 2
1− p
p
τD
)2
⇔ (1− p)(y0(σ)− y1(σ))p
2 + (1− p)y1(σ)
> 4
1− p
p
τD + 4
(1− p)2
p2
τ2D .
(G5)
where we used  = ln(1 + 2 1−pp τD) in the second line, which
is a result from Lemma 1. We can distinguish the following
cases:
1. If (1−p)τD/p < 1, we replace the right side of Eq. (G5)
by its upper bound, i.e.,
(1− p)(y0(σ)− y1(σ))
p
2 + (1− p)y1(σ)
> 8
1− p
p
τD
⇔ (y0(σ)− y1(σ))
4 + 8 (1−p)p y1(σ)
> τD ; (G6)
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2. If (1 − p)τD/p > 1, or equivalently p ∈ (0, 1/2), we
replace the right side of Eq. (G5) by its upper bound,
i.e.,
(1− p)(y0(σ)− y1(σ))
p
2 + (1− p)y1(σ)
> 8
(1− p)2
p2
τ2D
⇔ (y0(σ)− y1(σ))
4 (1−p)p + 8
(1−p)2
p2 y1(σ)
> τ2D . (G7)
The definition B ≡ y0(σ)/y1(σ) implies
y0(σ) = By1(σ)⇔ y0(σ) = B/(1 +B). (G8)
Inserting this into Eqs. (G6) and (G7) we have
B − 1
4(B + 1) + 8 (1−p)p
> τD (G9)
for the first case p ∈ (0, 1/2), and
B − 1
4 (1−p)p (B + 1) + 8
(1−p)2
p2
> τ2D (G10)
for the second case p ∈ [1/2, 1).
Appendix H: Numerical simulation details
In this section, we explain how our quantum classifier is
implemented and then use a generic metric to evaluate the per-
formance of our defense protocol.
1. Implementation of quantum classifier
Our quantum classifier is composed of four main ingre-
dients, i.e., the unitary Uprep for state preparation, the pa-
rameterized quantum circuits U(θ) where θ are to be opti-
mised, the final projective measurements |0〉〈0| and |1〉〈1| in
the σz basis and the depolarisation channel Np that is con-
ditionally applied at testing time. Note that it doesn’t mat-
ter where the depolarisation channel is placed in the circuit
since results only depend on the product
∏l
i=1(1−pi), where
p ≡ 1−∏li=1(1−pi). Our circuit is shown in Figure 7, com-
posed of two qubits, where each entry of the classical input
vector is separately encoded into the amplitude of the quantum
state in the computational basis. The state preparation unitary
Uprep, i.e., the computation of parameters {xi}5i=1, follows
from [32]. This U(θ) is composed of 5 ‘layers’, where each
layer consist of trainable single-qubit gates and two-qubits
gates as shown in the upper right panel of Figure 7, high-
lighted by the dashed box. The layers are then sequentially
applied to form U(θ) [4]. The mathematical representation
of U(θi,1) = RZ(θi,1)RY (θi+1,1)RZ(θi+2,1) and the total
number of trainable parameters is 25.
FIG. 7: Our binary QNN classifier. The upper left panel shows the
main structure of the quantum classifier and the upper right panel
illustrates one ‘layer’ in the implementation of the trainable unitary
and we employ 5 ‘layers’ in total. The lower panel is the quantum
circuit that encodes the classical input data into a quantum state.
2. Evaluation
An evaluation metric broadly used in classical adversarial
learning is the conventional accuracy, which measures the pre-
diction accuracy of the test dataset under adversarial attacks
with respect to different bounded-norms [23, 42]. The mathe-
matical expression for the conventional accuracy Accc is
Accc =
∑|DTe|
i=1 1c¯i=c∗i
|DTe| , (H1)
where |DTe| is the size of the test dataset, c¯i and c∗i are the pre-
dicted and real labels the ith test example. Here 1c¯i=c∗i is the
indicator function, which takes the value ‘1’ when c¯i = c∗i and
is ‘0’ otherwise. Using the depolarisation noise p = 0.5, 0.8
FIG. 8: Conventional accuracy for different depolarisation noise p.
We denote L as the maximum l2 bounded-norm used in the adversar-
ial attack. The conventional accuracy corresponding to p = 0.5, 0.8
is with respect to L is in red and blue respectively. The label ‘base-
line’ refers to the conventional accuracy with when p = 0.
and τD = 0.015, we explore the tradeoff between adversar-
ial robustness and the conventional accuracy for our classifier.
Let L ∈ (0, 0.7] and nsamp = 300. The number of itera-
tions used to generate adversarial attacks is set to 50 without
16
early stopping. Figure 8 illustrates the simulation results un-
der p = 0, 0.5, 0.8. We can see how our protocol increases
the robustness against l2 norm attacks with increasing p. For
instance, the conventional accuracy of our baseline (p = 0)
drops to zero when L = 0.4, while the conventional accuracy
remains non-zero for both p = 0.5 and p = 0.8. In addition,
a larger depolarisation noise p promises a better robustness
against large L. Specifically, when L = 0.1, the conventional
accuracy when p = 0.8 is slightly less than when p = 0.5.
However, with increased L, the conventional accuracy when
p = 0.8 outperforms the case when p = 0.5. Also when
L = 0.5, both baseline and p = 0.5 cases have the zero con-
ventional accuracy, while the setting p = 0.8 gives non-zero
conventional accuracy.
